



Benefits of India partnership with United State

Dr. Ravin Kumar Sehrawat

Ex Student, M.D.U., Rohtak, Haryana, India

Abstract

The main extract of this article is that how Partnership with United State will be beneficial to India. For the study of present topic the investigator used the analytical methods for this article by reviewing relevant publications, primarily based on the online journals available on Internet, Wikipedia, Elsevier and Journal of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses and other related literature.

Keywords: Benefits of India partnership, Partnership with United State

Introduction

A partnership with the US may help India achieve most of its strategic goals especially in the fields of economics, defense, space and high technology and facilitate the growth of India into a developed nation. India needs capital and the US needs markets. Both nations confront terrorism in its worst form. The US is leading the war on terror, and India can certainly benefit from cooperation in this field.

US need partners to secure its interests outside the US, more so in Asia. The US needs new and stable markets. In addition, India has a huge and experienced military capable of sharing the burden of international military operations. "Successfully wooing India is key to preserving the liberal, American-led international order." The commonality of interests and values of the US and India make India one of the most suitable potential long-term allies to the US.

As in the past, US-Indian counterterrorism cooperation will continue to be constrained by these foreign policy differences; it may also be limited by differences in focus. India now identifies terrorism particularly by militants linked to Pakistan—as its top security challenge, according to a recent report by the Ministry of Defense. Much of the terrorism preoccupying India notably that in the northeast is generated by home-grown separatist or ideologically-based groups, however, not by Islamist militants. These groups' use of neighboring countries for sanctuary has prompted India to press, with a degree of success, the governments of Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Bhutan to help curb cross-border transfers of rebels and weapons.⁴⁸ Meanwhile, India's two main Maoist rebel groups—which have ties to the burgeoning Nepalese insurgency may have recently joined forces to oppose the Indian government all the way from the borders with Nepal down into southern India. Indian police sources have credited the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with providing key information on the merger and on ties between India's Naxalite groups and a worldwide Maoist umbrella group. The State Department has since placed one of the Indian groups on the US terrorist organization list. India's internal politics may shape cooperation with the United States in other respects, as

well. Broader bilateral economic ties could help cushion policy differences between the US and India on other issues, as has occurred between the United States and China. A sine qua non for expanded US private investment in India will be continued economic reforms by successive Indian governments. Populist economic policies would pose one sort of challenge to the reform process. Alternatively, if India were to move toward the "Italian model" of rapidly cycling coalition governments, this could paralyze its economic reforms as well as foreign policy. The current government, the latest in a series of coalitions, has a sufficiently slim parliamentary margin to warrant considering such a scenario. The US-India relationship holds considerable promise, despite the constraints on a broad international partnership. Among the potential growth areas are cooperation in science and technology, expanded trade and investment, a shared interest in safeguarding sea-borne commerce, and, to a lesser degree, counterterrorism. As Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran told a group of foreign business executives and policy makers in December 2004, "We have today come to a point where in India-U.S. relations there is a certain degree of predictability and stability" after years of Cold War animosity.⁵⁰ Many Indian officials, however, remain mistrustful of US intentions, extraordinarily secretive about India's national defense preparations, and leery of western "big brotherism"—all factors in New Delhi's refusal to let even western NGOs provide relief to the stricken Andaman Islands after the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004.⁵¹ Washington will need to step carefully and knowledgeably around India's evolving sensitivities, priorities, and domestic realities to bolster a strong, growing India's inclination.

Based on the facts on the importance of the Indian Ocean and the US relationship with South Asia, it is clear that the Indian Ocean is one of the busiest in terms of maritime, political and military activities. US involvement in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India coupled with Chinese influence in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka could make the region a hub of politico-military activities in the international system. It is also clear that almost all seven countries in South Asia have deep

routed internal problems and economic and political turmoil of their own. U.S. foreign policy interest in the coming decades—for both positive and negative reasons. India will continue to rise as a global actor, even if the pace of its advance may be uneven. It would be difficult to imagine a positive Asian future without a democratic, friendly India. The United States has a vital interest in regional stability. Despite Islamabad's and New Delhi's doubts about Washington's regional policies, both seem likely to count on the United States to keep future confrontations from spiraling into conflict. Given the different motivations for developing nuclear weapons at work in India and Pakistan and the powerful institutional interests that have grown up around them to say nothing of the enormous public support for these weapons there is no question of South Asia renouncing nuclear weapons unless there are substantial moves toward global nuclear disarmament. Pakistan's policy makers have repeatedly committed themselves to keeping nuclear weapons as long as India has them. Neither the present nor any future Indian government is likely to give up its nuclear capability as long as there are other nuclear weapon states. The nuclear weapon states, for their part, resolutely refuse even to consider negotiations on a convention eliminating nuclear weapons.

. All major powers, including the United States, European Union, China, Japan, and Russia, are expanding their engagement with the Subcontinent. On the economic front, India's high level of performance in recent years has brought the region into sharp focus. However, such high growth rates are also visible across the Subcontinent, making it the second-fastest growing region in the world after China. India is now an important factor in managing new international trade, energy, and environmental challenges. On the political front, most major issues that confront U.S. policy international terrorism, Islamic radicalism, weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, state failure, nation building, and promotion of democracy United States has simultaneously helped to improve bilateral relations between New Delhi and Islamabad, an objective that for decades was deemed impossible. Deliberate American neutrality in the India-Pakistan conflicts has encouraged New Delhi and Islamabad to embark on a bilateral, and rather productive, peace process. Since 9/11, America has been involved in stabilizing Pakistan and Afghanistan against local and trans-national threats of terrorism and religious extremism, while also economically modernizing the region.

India has been an important strategic priority for the United States. Washington's bipartisan approach to India is reflected in the Democratic Party's leadership and in the Republican Bush administration's decision to renew civilian nuclear cooperation with India between Washington and New Delhi over the nuclear issue, and create the basis for a stronger bilateral partnership. That precisely is the reason why the Indian communist parties want to see the deal's demise. The next administration must reaffirm the commitment for an early implementation of the civil nuclear initiative with India. Simultaneously, it must find ways to insulate the promising parts of the relationship especially defense cooperation if the absence of a political consensus in India delays the implementation of the civil nuclear initiative. The next U.S. administration must persist with the core objectives of

transforming bilateral relations with India

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